Abstract-This paper shows that Corollary 1 of "On Multiple Linear Approximations" is incorrect. In particular, the value given for the gain by Corollary 1 is likely to be a significant overestimate of this quantity. Thus, any data requirements for linear cryptanalysis with multiple linear approximations based on this value for the gain are highly questionable.
where is a data mask, is one bit of key information, is a plaintext and is a corresponding ciphertext. The value is known as the imbalance or correlation (twice the bias) of the linear approximation. If , then it is possible to estimate the key bit reasonably accurately if the number of plaintextciphertext pairs is at least [1] . Enhanced forms of linear cryptanalysis [2] , [3] use a collection of such linear approximations. Such a situation with multiple linear approximations is also considered by [4] , where the gain of such a linear cryptanalysis is defined. The gain is a attempt to quantify the advantage of such a linear cryptanalysis over exhaustive search.
This paper is concerned with the values given for the gain by [4] . In particular, there are two results given for the value of the gain, namely Theorem 1 and of [4, Corollary 1] , where it is claimed that the value for the gain given by Corollary 1 is an accurate (asymptotic) approximation of that given by Theorem 1. We show the value for the gain given by Corollary 1 generally greatly exceeds the value for the gain given by Theorem 1, so this claim is not correct. bits of information about the block cipher key. We let denote the key class, and we denote the set of all key classes by , so and . We let denote the key class containing the true key, and, without loss of generality, we suppose that . We let denote the set of key classes not containing the true key, so . We denote the -dimensional imbalance vector corresponding to key class by , so
We note that the squared distance from such an imbalance vector to the imbalance vector for the true key class is given by III. STATEMENT OF THEOREM 1 AND COROLLARY 1
For completeness, we now state Theorem 1 and [4, Corollary 1], but using to denote the value for the gain given by the expression of Corollary 1.
Theorem 1 [4] : Given linear approximations and independent pairs , an adversary can mount an attack with a gain equal to:
where is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, , and is the number of key classes induced by the approximations.
0018-9448/$26.00 © 2011 IEEE Corollary 1 [4] : If is sufficiently large, then the value for the gain given in Theorem 1 can be accurately approximated by where .
IV. CONCEPTS USED TO DEFINE GAIN VALUES
The value given for the gain by Theorem 1 and the value given for the gain by Corollary 1 can both be expressed in terms of two functions, and , and a random variable , which we now define.
The function on the positive real numbers is defined by where denotes the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable. We note that is a convex function of for as
The function on the positive real numbers is defined by
We note that is a decreasing function of for as
The random variable on is defined for by so is the random variable giving the squared distance of an imbalance vector for an incorrect key class from the imbalance vector for the true key class. Thus the distribution of is given by
V. COMPARISON OF VALUES FOR THE GAIN
We now compare the two values and given for the gain in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. We show in Appendix A that the value given for the gain by Theorem 1 can be expressed as and we show in Appendix B that the value given for the gain by Corollary 1 can be expressed as However, this value for the gain can be well approximated by , where
We now use Jensen's inequality [5] to compare and . As is a convex function of the positive real numbers, Jensen's inequality shows that Furthermore is a decreasing function of the positive real numbers, so However, is usually extremely well-approximated by , so giving Lemma 1.
Lemma 1:
The value for the gain given by Corollary 1 generally exceeds the value given for the gain by Theorem 1.
VI. EXAMPLE VALUES FOR THE GAIN
The important issue in the use of the value given by Corollary 1 to approximate the value of the gain given by Theorem 1 is whether the overestimate of by referred to in Lemma 1 is significant. The following examples show that it is generally the case that the use of given in Corollary 1 gives a large overestimate of the value given for the gain by Theorem 1.
For simplicity, we assume that all linear approximations have the same imbalance , that is . The capacity of such a collection of linear approximations is clearly . In this situation, using the result given in Section II, we have
As there are such vectors with , the random variable is given by Thus, is a multiple of a censored random variable with 0 removed, so the mean of is given by . We therefore obtain , used to define , as By contrast, the mean of is given by Furthermore, a direct calculation gives , so is obviously a very good approximation of . In this situation, Corollary 1 overestimates the gain as given by Theorem 1 by over one bit in six.
More generally, we can consider the situation as the number of linear approximations increases. As above, we suppose we have plaintext-ciphertext pairs, each of which has imbalance , so the capacity . The following Table compares values for the gain given by Theorem 1 with the values for the gain given by Corollary 1 for linear approximations. It can be clearly seen that the overestimate for value of the gain of Theorem 1 given by Corollary 1 increases both in absolute and relative terms as the number of linear approximations increases.
VII. THE "PROOF" OF COROLLARY 1
Appendix A.1 of [4] is entitled Proof of Corollary 1, and Appendix A.1 essentially asserts that , Jensen's inequality notwithstanding. The examples of Section VI shows that this assertion, which is the basis of the "proof" of Corollary 1, is simply wrong. Appendix A.1 attempts to justify this assertion by considering the Taylor series for about the point (in our terminology), taking expectations, and then implicitly assuming that: the higher order (second and above) moments of are sufficiently small [4] . However, the second order moment is simply the variance of , and this is generally not negligible. For example, in the cases considered in Section VI in which all imbalances are equal to , the second order moment of is given by which is never negligible and indeed increases with . As with the discussion by [4] of probabilities for dependent data masks [6] , the given "proof" of Corollary 1 by [4] is not correct.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that the value for the gain given by Corollary 1 of [4] is not reliable, and is in general a large overestimate of the value of the gain given by Theorem 1. Furthermore, the "proof" given of Corollary 1 simply ignores Jensen's inequality, a fundamental result in probability and theoretical statistics. Any result based on this value for the gain given by Corollary 1, such as the theoretical data requirements for such a linear cryptanalysis, is therefore highly questionable. If we now define the value then clearly is a very good approximation of when is moderately large.
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